Thursday, November 29, 2007

 

NYT: U.S. Says Attacks in Iraq Fell To the Level of Early Last Year



To be sure, the level of violence in Iraq is still high. Even as military officials announced the figures, Iraq had one of its deadliest days in weeks, with at least 22 people killed. Among the killed were nine civilians in Karada, a mixed neighborhood in central Baghdad, when a car bomber rammed a convoy carrying Iraq's deputy finance minister. The official was not hurt, but a guard was among the wounded.

Also on Sunday, three children were killed and seven were wounded in Baquba, to the north, in an explosion in a small garden where American soldiers were handing out candy, ballpoint pens and soccer balls. Three American soldiers were also killed. Their names were not released.


-----

November 19, 2007

U.S. Says Attacks in Iraq Fell To the Level of Early Last Year

The American military said Sunday that the weekly number of attacks in Iraq had fallen to the lowest level since just before the February 2006 bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra, an event commonly used as a benchmark for the country's worst spasm of bloodletting after the American invasion nearly five years ago.

Data released at a news conference in Baghdad showed that attacks had declined to the lowest level since January 2006. It is the third week in a row that attacks have been at this reduced level.

The statistics on attack trends have long been a standard measure that the American military has used to assess violence in Iraq. Because the data have been gathered for years and are deemed generally reliable they allow analysts to identify trends.

Military officials said the attacks were directed against American and Iraqi forces, as well as civilians. But since the source for the data is American military reports, and not the Iraqi government, the figures do not provide an exhaustive measure of sectarian violence.

Nonetheless, the figures added to a body of evidence, compiled by American and Iraqi officials, indicating that the violence had diminished significantly since the United States reinforced troop levels in Iraq and adopted a new counterinsurgency strategy.

The data released Sunday cover attacks using car bombs, roadside bombs, mines, mortars, rockets, surface-to-air missiles and small arms. According to the statistics, roughly 575 attacks occurred last week.

That is substantially fewer than the more than 700 attacks that were recorded the week that Sunni militants set off a wave of sectarian violence in Iraq by blowing up a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February 2006. And it represents a huge drop since June when attacks soared to nearly 1,600 one week.

American officials said other measures indicated that civilian deaths had dropped. Rear Adm. Gregory Smith, a spokesman for the command, said civilian deaths had dropped by 60 percent since June.

Military analysts said a number of factors explained the drop. They say, for example, that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a predominantly Iraqi insurgent group with foreign leadership, has been greatly weakened by American military attacks.

Thousands of new Sunni volunteers have made common cause with the Americans. About 72,000 such civilians have joined the effort, American officials said, and 45,000 each receive a $300 a month stipend from the Americans to help with the effort.

Moktada al-Sadr, the anti-American cleric, has ordered his militiamen to stand down. American military officials also say that Iran appears to be abiding by a commitment to reduce the flow of roadside bombs and other weapons into Iraq. Beyond that, many Iraqis appear to be exhausted by the sectarian violence and eager for a modicum of stability.

To be sure, the level of violence in Iraq is still high. Even as military officials announced the figures, Iraq had one of its deadliest days in weeks, with at least 22 people killed. Among the killed were nine civilians in Karada, a mixed neighborhood in central Baghdad, when a car bomber rammed a convoy carrying Iraq's deputy finance minister. The official was not hurt, but a guard was among the wounded.

Also on Sunday, three children were killed and seven were wounded in Baquba, to the north, in an explosion in a small garden where American soldiers were handing out candy, ballpoint pens and soccer balls. Three American soldiers were also killed. Their names were not released.

Some experts said the data indicated a downward trend in violent attacks, albeit from relatively high levels -- 2006 was one of the most violent years in the war.

The most pressing issue, they said, was how to keep them down and reduce violence further given the failure of Iraqi leaders to achieve reconciliation.

''These trends are stunning in military terms and beyond the predictions of most proponents of the surge last winter,'' said Michael O'Hanlon, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution, referring to President Bush's troop reinforcement plan. ''Nobody knows if the trends are durable in the absence of national reconciliation and in the face of major U.S. troop drawdowns in 2008.''

Military officials stressed that attack levels might fluctuate in the future and that it was too soon to say that the United States had turned the corner in Iraq. Past periods of relative calm in Iraq have also been shattered by violence. And American officials have complained that the Iraqi government is not taking the opportunity in the current lull to attempt serious political progress.

''While violence is turning in the right direction, a tough fight remains ahead and progress will be uneven,'' Admiral Smith said. ''Violence is still too high in many areas of Baghdad and across Iraq.''

Still, he rattled off statistics that pointed to progress in lowering violence. Casualties suffered by Iraqi security forces, he said, were down 40 percent since the beginning of the troop reinforcement plan. Civilian fatalities in Baghdad, he said, were down 75 percent in recent months. In some areas, the attacks have not been so low since the spring and summer of 2005.

Since the violence has decreased in Baghdad people have begun trickling back into cafes and streets in the hope that the calm will last.

Two weeks ago, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki said the dip in violence had allowed 7,000 families to return to Baghdad, though it was not clear how he arrived at that figure.





Tuesday, November 20, 2007

 

McClatchy Washington Bureau: Report: 14 percent of Iraqis now displaced



McClatchy Washington Bureau

Posted on Tue, Nov. 06, 2007

Report: 14 percent of Iraqis now displaced

last updated: November 06, 2007 08:00:18 PM

WASHINGTON — The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction offered a generally optimistic picture of security developments in Iraq in his quarterly report to Congress on Tuesday, but noted that while violence was down, one of every seven Iraqis — 14 percent of Iraq's population — is now displaced by the war.

The report said that electricity production in Iraq reached its highest level since early 2003, in part because insurgent attacks on power-lines and repair crews have declined. Corruption, however, remains a major problem, the report said.

The deaths of 72 civilian contractors working on U.S.-funded projects in Iraq were reported to the U.S. Department of Labor during the third quarter of the year, a 22 percent increase over the average of previous quarters, the report said.

The deaths brought to 1,073 the number of civilians working on U.S.-funded projects who've died in Iraq since the war there began, the report said. The report did not say how the 72 died.

Private companies with U.S. contracts are required to report any deaths to the Department of Labor under U.S. regulations.

The report, which was released on the same day Special Inspector General Stuart Bowen testified before a congressional subcommittee, also said that the number of mortar and rocket attacks on the Green Zone in Baghdad during the quarter had declined to the lowest levels in a year. But mortar and rocket attacks on Camp Victory, where the U.S. military is headquarters, increased during the same period. Attacks there killed one person on Sept. 11 and two people on October 11, the report said.

ON THE WEB

Read the report in full (PDF).

McClatchy Newspapers 2007



Sunday, November 18, 2007

 

(BN) `Frustrated' Anti-War Voters Raise Heat on Democrats They Helped Put in Office



Anti-War Voters Lash Out at Democrats They Helped Put in Office
2007-11-13 00:02 (New York)


By Nicholas Johnston
    Nov. 13 (Bloomberg) -- When the Democratic Party called up
recently to ask Myrna Burgess for a campaign contribution, she
answered with an emphatic ``no.''
    ``Nothing has been done as far as the war is concerned,''
said Burgess, 72, an Amtrak worker from Levittown, Pennsylvania.
    More than a year after anti-war voters like Burgess helped
give Democrats control of Congress, there are more troops in
Iraq, lawmakers have approved almost $100 billion in new war
spending and congressional approval ratings are at record lows.
    Democrats now worry that their inability to make good on
campaign promises to end or slow the war in Iraq will have
consequences. The disaffection has already fueled at least four
anti-war primary challenges to party incumbents, raising fears
among some lawmakers of an intra-party fight that could drain
momentum before next year's elections.
    ``They want someone to be held accountable,'' said
Representative Lynn Woolsey of California, a leading anti-war
Democrat in the House.
    For the moment, political analysts said polls show that
Democrats are likely to keep or expand their congressional
majorities. While only 22 percent of registered voters said they
approve of the way Congress is handling its job in a
Bloomberg/Los Angeles Times survey conducted last month, those
voters are almost evenly split over which party is to blame.

                        Blaming Republicans

    Voters are ``extremely frustrated'' about the absence of
results, said freshman Democratic Representative Patrick Murphy,
an Iraq veteran who was elected last year in Burgess's district
on an anti-war platform. At the same time, he predicted that
President George W. Bush's party would bear the brunt in next
year's presidential and congressional elections.
    ``They will take out their frustrations on them and
rightfully so,'' he said.
    Still, there are some trouble spots for Democrats, as
groups across the country begin to try to harness the voter
disapproval. In Washington state, the anti-war group MoveOn.org
has produced ads condemning Democratic Representative Brian
Baird for his refusal to support legislative timetables for a
withdrawal from Iraq. The group is also polling members on
whether to mount primary challenges against the lawmakers they
consider ineffective in trying to end the war.

                        Primary Challenge

    Already in Illinois, where congressional primaries have
been moved up to Feb. 5, anti-war challengers have emerged to
take on two House Democrats, Melissa Bean and Dan Lipinski. Both
incumbents are expected to prevail easily, and Lipinski is in a
safe Democratic seat. Bean's is one of the top Democratic seats
being targeted by Republicans, however, and a primary battle
could weaken her in the general election.
    In Maryland, a primary opponent has criticized Democrat
Albert Wynn's early support of the war, and in California, House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi faces a primary challenge from Cindy
Sheehan, an anti-war activist who lost a son in Iraq and has led
protests across the country.
    As primary filing deadlines approach, more anti-war
candidates are likely to spring up, said Brandon Friedman, vice
chairman of VoteVets.org, a group that recruits military
veterans who oppose the Iraq war to run for Congress.
    ``The Democrats were elected in 2006 to end the war in
Iraq, and that hasn't happened,'' he said. ``This frustration is
going to manifest itself in a lot of different ways in the next
year.''
    That sentiment was evident in interviews in the
Philadelphia suburbs last month with more than a dozen anti-war
voters, who said Democrats hadn't used their congressional
majority to thwart Bush's policies.

                          `Disappointed'

    ``I am disappointed because I thought they would get a lot
more accomplished,'' Harold Fisher, an 82-year old retiree from
Levittown, said.
    Last year, these Philadelphia-area voters helped Democrats
gain two new House seats, including the one held by Murphy, an
Iraq war veteran who won by just 1,157 votes out of almost
250,000 cast.
    Anti-war rumblings haven't yet translated into a serious
challenge for Murphy, 34, and Pennsylvania's other freshmen
Democrats. Voters such as Joel Tenenbaum, a 58-year-old
government employee from Levittown, say they want to give them
more time, or wider majorities.
    ``They want to get this stuff done but they don't have the
votes,'' Tenenbaum said.

                          Democratic Edge

    Nationally, anti-war sentiment continues to give Democrats
a strong ``edge'' next year, said Donald Kettl, director of the
Fels Institute of Government at the University of Pennsylvania
in Philadelphia. ``Republicans are going to have a difficult
time,'' he said.
    To mollify their critics, Democrats have pledged to
continue to push for a change of course in Iraq. They plan to
vote this week on a $50 billion war-funding bill that mandates
troop withdrawals. The measure is expected to do no better than
previous attempts, which have either died in the Senate or been
vetoed by Bush.
    Democratic leaders acknowledge that these stalemates may be
eroding their support with the party's anti-war wing, and say
they are aware of the potential for a voter backlash.
    ``We haven't been effective in ending the war in Iraq,''
Pelosi told reporters Nov. 1. ``If you asked me in a phone call,
as ardent a Democrat as I am, I would disapprove of Congress as
well.''

--Editor: Berley (rdm/tab).

To contact the reporter on this story:
Nicholas Johnston in Levittown, Pennsylvania at
+1-202-654-1264 or njohnston3@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Michael Forsythe in Washington +1-202-624-1940
mforsythe@bloomberg.net

[TAGINFO]

NI US
NI GOV
NI CNG
NI PA
NI IRAQ
NI POL
NI WAR
NI DC



#<698734.4653949.1.0.60.17559.25>#
-0- Nov/13/2007 05:02 GMT


Wednesday, November 14, 2007

 

NYT: Decks Are Stacked in War Crimes Cases, Lawyers Say




Todd Heisler/The New York Times

A detention area at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where a military commission began hearing new claims on Thursday.



November 9, 2007

Decks Are Stacked in War Crimes Cases, Lawyers Say

GUANTÁNAMO BAY, Cuba, Nov. 8 — The administration's problem-plagued military commission system started up here again Thursday, but it began with contentious new claims that the war crimes cases are unfairly stacked against detainees.

Military defense lawyers said that on the eve of the hearing, military prosecutors told them for the first time of a government witness who might be able to help a detainee, Omar Ahmed Khadr, counter the war crimes charges on which he was arraigned Thursday.

Mr. Khadr, the only Canadian detainee at Guantánamo, has been held here since he was 16. He is now 21.

"It is an eyewitness the government has always known about," said Lt. Cmdr. William C. Kuebler of the Navy, Mr. Khadr's chief military lawyer, who questioned why the military was only now informing the defense. Mr. Khadr is charged with the murder of an American soldier, spying, material support for terrorism and other charges.

In court, military prosecutors accomplished one of their goals after a long delay in the commission cases by completing the new arraignment for Mr. Khadr. It was the first arraignment since all Guantánamo war crimes cases were stalled by legal rulings against the prosecutors in June that were later overturned.

Thursday's proceedings were important for Bush administration officials, who are frustrated at the pace of the Guantánamo war crimes cases, which have repeatedly been halted by practical difficulties and court rulings.

Mr. Khadr appeared in court wearing a white prison uniform — the color indicated he was a compliant detainee — and was relaxed throughout the two-hour hearing.

Mr. Khadr's case has drawn wide attention, both because of his age and because his Toronto family has deep ties to Al Qaeda. His lawyers argue that he should be treated with the leniency often accorded child soldiers under international law, since he was a teenager at the time of the alleged crimes. Mr. Khadr did not enter a plea, and no trial date was set.

The controversy over the witness emerged after the hearing was completed. Defense lawyers said the new disclosures by prosecutors in closed-door meetings showed that the system was not intended to be fair.

Michael J. Berrigan, the deputy chief military defense lawyer for the Guantánamo cases, told reporters that defense lawyers had been told Tuesday night of the existence of a witness who could provide information that could help Mr. Khadr.

"How we can have newly discovered evidence is beyond me," since prosecutors have been pursuing charges against Mr. Khadr for years, Mr. Berrigan said. The lawyers said they could not describe the witness because prosecutors told them the information was classified.

"Every time you all come down here you see the problems in this process," Mr. Berrigan said. Spokesmen for the military said prosecutors turn over information that could help a defendant when they learn of it. The military prosecutors declined to answer questions from reporters.

In response to defense assertions that military commission participants are under pressure from superiors to get war crimes cases moving quickly, a spokeswoman for the Office of Military Commissions, Lt. Catheryne Pully, said, "Our interest is in making sure the process is done correctly, not quickly."

Commander Kuebler used the courtroom session to mount a strenuous challenge to the military judge hearing the case, Col. Peter E. Brownback III of the Army.

Commander Kuebler noted that the judge had barred the defense from raising challenges at this stage of the case to the constitutionality of the military commission system. He added that the judge had told him in a closed-door meeting that he had "taken a lot of heat" after issuing one of the rulings in June that stalled the commission cases. Pentagon officials and a White House spokesman said they disagreed with the June rulings.

Colonel Brownback, clearly irritated, said he had not intended Commander Kuebler to disclose that conversation but said, "I never said anyone who had any influence over me said anything."




Monday, November 12, 2007

 

NYT: Guantánamo by the Numbers




Raymond Verdaguer



November 10, 2007
Op-Ed Contributors

Guantánamo by the Numbers

SIX years ago this Tuesday, President Bush granted American armed forces sweeping authority to detain and interrogate foreign members of Al Qaeda and their supporters and to use military commissions to try them. By doing so, the president set in motion the creation of military commissions and the detention camp in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

The Bush administration may legitimately claim certain benefits from the Guantánamo system. Some dangerous men are held there, and valuable intelligence has probably been gathered, perhaps even some that has enabled the government to disrupt terrorist activities.

But the costs have been high. Guantánamo has come to be seen worldwide as a stain on America's reputation. The military commissions have failed to deliver justice, stymied by the federal courts' refusal to permit the president to create a system at odds with United States courts-martial and the international law of war.

Meanwhile, the number of detainees at Guantánamo has steadily dropped to a little over 300, from its peak of more than 700, no more than 80 of whom are likely to face any kind of American prosecution. Not a single defendant has gone to trial, and only one has pleaded guilty.

Today, most American leaders acknowledge the need for a new approach. The president himself has expressed a desire to see the detention camp closed. But he has only a little more than a year to do so before the next president takes office. It's time to take a close look at this system of detention and prosecution and move quickly to establish viable alternatives. With apologies to the Harper's Index, the following data provide a historical snapshot.

A Denim Jacket for Your Time

Number of "high-value detainees" now at Guantánamo: 15

Approximate percentage of detainees found to have committed "hostile acts" against the United States or coalition forces before detention: 53

Approximate number of countries of which detainees are citizens: 40

Most represented countries at Guantánamo: Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Yemen

Cost of building Guantánamo high-security detention facilities: about $54 million

Estimated annual cost of operating Guantánamo: $90 million to $118 million

Cost of "expeditionary legal complex" for the military commission (under construction): $10 million to $12 million

Number of books in the Guantánamo detention library: 5,143

Number of Korans issued to detainees from January 2002 to June 2005: more than 1,600

Number of daily calories per detainee: Up to 4,200, including halal meat

Average weight gain per detainee: 20 pounds

Number of pills dispensed per day: 1,000, to 200-300 detainees

Number of apparent suicides: 4

Number of apparent suicide attempts: 41, by 25 detainees (as of May 2006)

Number of detainee assaults on guards using "bodily fluids": more than 400

Date of first visit to Guantánamo by the International Committee of the Red Cross: Jan. 18, 2002

Approximate number of visits by lawyers to Guantánamo detainees so far this year: 1,100

Month of first habeas corpus petition filed to challenge detention at Guantánamo: January 2002

Number of habeas corpus petitions filed in federal courts on behalf of detainees: roughly 300

Number of detainees designated by the president as "eligible" for trial by military commission: 14

Number actually charged with crimes (for example, murder and material support for terrorism): 10

Number of pending cases: 3

Number of convictions: 1 (an Australian who pleaded guilty to material support of terrorism and was sentenced to nine months of confinement in his home country)

Estimated number of detainees who may be charged in the future: 80

Month of first release of a detainee: May 2002 (one detainee repatriated to Afghanistan because of an "emotional breakdown")

Approximate number of detainees released: 445

Approximate number of current detainees found eligible for transfer or release: 70

Countries to which Guantánamo detainees have been transferred: Albania, Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen

Most recent announced transfer of detainees from Guantánamo: Nov. 4 (eight to Afghanistan, three to Jordan)

Personal items provided to detainees upon departure: a Koran, a denim jacket, a white T-shirt, a pair of blue jeans, high-top sneakers, a gym bag of toiletries and a pillow and blanket for the flight home

Number of detainees said by Pentagon to have resumed hostile activities against the United States after release: at least 30

Number of United States senators who voted in favor of a nonbinding resolution that Guantánamo detainees "should not be released into American society, nor should they be transferred stateside into facilities in American communities and neighborhoods": 94

Number of bills in Congress calling for the closing of Guantánamo: 3

Number of members of the House of Representatives who signed a letter to President Bush in June 2007 urging him to close Guantánamo and move the detainees to military prisons in the United States: 145

Number of Republicans who signed the letter: 1

Democratic presidential candidates who are on record supporting closing Guantánamo: 8

Republican presidential candidates who are: 2 (John McCain and Ron Paul)

Closest American allies that have called for Guantánamo's closing: Britain, France, Germany

Next scheduled legal test of the Guantánamo system: Boumediene v. Bush, a challenge to the denial of habeas corpus, set for argument before the Supreme Court on Dec. 5

David Bowker, a lawyer in New York, and David Kaye, the acting director of the Program on International Human Rights Law at the University of California, Los Angeles, were staff lawyers at the State Department during the Clinton and Bush administrations.





Sunday, November 11, 2007

 

NYT: In the Bond Market, a Bleak Prognosis for Iraq



Economic View

In the Bond Market, a Bleak Prognosis for Iraq

David G. Klein



Published: November 11, 2007

PRESIDENT BUSH'S surge of troops in Iraq has done little to resolve the political debate over the Iraq war. But global financial markets have been monitoring the war for months, and with remarkable consistency, they have concluded that the long-term prospects for a stable Iraq are very bleak.

That is the picture that emerges from a study by Michael Greenstone, an economics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, titled, "Is the 'Surge' Working? Some New Facts," which has been circulating as a working paper in academic circles.

Professor Greenstone started by reviewing basic statistics on the Iraqi economy and on the battle for security within Iraq since February. This data provided a murky view, at best.

He found that civilian deaths in Iraq had fallen substantially in recent months. At the same time, though, he found little change in the rate of American and Iraqi military fatalities, while the recruitment of members of the new Iraqi security forces declined sharply. On the industrial side, crude oil production fell as much as 20 percent, but there was evidence of a slight improvement in the availability of electricity.

Sifting through these facts was time-consuming, but it provided little real guidance on the state of affairs in Iraq.

It wasn't until Professor Greenstone began examining the financial markets' pricing of Iraqi government debt that he had his eureka moment. It was immediately clear that the bond market — which, historically, has often been an early indicator of the demise of a political system — was pessimistic about the Iraqi government's chances for survival.

First, some background on the Iraqi bonds. After the United States helped Iraq renegotiate its leftover debt from the Saddam Hussein era, the Iraqi government issued about $3 billion of new bonds in January 2006. These dollar-denominated bonds pay 2.9 percent twice a year and mature in 2028, paying the face value of $100.

To say the least, the market for these bonds is not robust: as of last week, a bond with a face value of $100 was trading at around $60. Professor Greenstone calculated that, from the markets' standpoint, the implied default risk over the life of the bond was about 80 percent.

The important point is that anyone who owns one of these Iraqi bonds has to decide each day whether the Iraqi government is likely to be functional enough to make its debt payments, or will default along the way. All else being equal, if the surge policy is effective, it ought to be raising the market price of these bonds.

Bondholders "aren't politically motivated," Professor Greenstone said. "They don't have to rationalize their previous statements or justify their votes from years past. All they care about is whether there will be a functioning Iraq in the future such that they will receive their payments." At a certain price, most securities will find a buyer, and there are still buyers for Iraqi bonds. But the price they are willing to pay is very low.

Of course, it's worth asking whether bond traders know anything more about Iraq than the pundits do. It's impossible to say with certainty, but the collective wisdom of financial markets has proved remarkably adept at evaluating events and predicting the future, even the turning points of war.

During the American Civil War, for example, when Confederate forces lost at Gettysburg, Confederate cotton bonds traded in England dropped by about 14 percent. During World War II, German government bonds fell 7 percent when the Russians started their counterattack at Stalingrad in 1942, and French government bonds rose 16 percent after the Allied invasion at Normandy in 1944. Many such examples of the prescience of financial markets have been documented by economic historians.

Comparing the yields on Iraqi bonds from the start of the surge in February to late August, Professor Greenstone calculated that the bondholders implicitly raised the chances of an Iraqi bond default by 40 percent. Over that period, Iraqi bond prices fell about 14 percent — as much as the Confederate cotton bonds fell after the battle of Gettysburg.

Professor Greenstone is quick to acknowledge that the bond evidence does not necessarily imply anything about the surge as a military tactic. The American troop buildup might be giving the Iraqi government a reprieve, but over the long term, most bondholders seem to have concluded, it's a lost cause.

In an interview, Professor Greenstone used a medical analogy to describe the possibility that the surge might be defined as successful, but would still result in the demise of the Iraqi government. "It might be a heart surgery that failed so the patient is dying," he said, "or a heart surgery that succeeded but during the operation they found a deadly liver cancer so the patient is dying. Either way, though, the guy is dying."

HE also knows that the late-summer turmoil in global bond markets because of the subprime housing problems and the ensuing credit crisis could complicate his analysis. But he points to two important pieces of evidence suggesting that the overall problems in the credit markets did not cause the Iraqi bond meltdown.

First, the Iraqi bonds were already falling before the subprime crisis began, and at no point did they ever rise above their pre-surge levels. So even if you do not attribute the entire 40 percent increase in the chance of default to the surge, there is certainly no evidence that it reduced the odds.

Second, and more important, while the bond-market turmoil affected all kinds of debt, the plunge in the value of Iraqi bonds has been much worse. Professor Greenstone's data shows that Iraqi bonds have fallen not just in comparison with safe United States Treasuries but also when compared with those of nearby Qatar, and with a broad range of risky emerging-market bonds.

In the market, people vote with their money, and the vote is not going well for the new Iraq. Politicians in the United States may be divided over whether the surge has raised the chances of political reconciliation in Iraq. But the bond market has already made its message clear: don't bet on it.

Austan Goolsbee is a professor of economics at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and a research fellow at the American Bar Foundation. He is advising the campaign of Senator Barack Obama of Illinois for the Democratic presidential nomination. E-mail: goolsbee@nytimes.com.



Thursday, November 08, 2007

 

(BN) Afghanistan Suicide Bombing Kills 90, Including Lawmakers,


Afghan Bomber Kills 90, Including Five Lawmakers, Reuters Says
2007-11-06 08:41 (New York)


By Patrick Donahue
    Nov. 6 (Bloomberg) -- At least 90 people were killed and
another 50 were wounded in northern Afghanistan when a suicide
bomber attacked a parliamentary delegation touring a sugar
factory, Reuters reported, citing a local hospital.
    Ninety bodies had been brought to the hospital, the director
told the newswire. Five lawmakers, including opposition spokesman
Mostafa Kazemi, were among the dead, the newswire cited a
provincial governor as saying.
    Damage from the suicide bombing today in the northern town
of Baghlan couldn't be assessed immediately because of the
magnitude of the attack, Reuters cited Baghlan intelligence chief
Abdurrahman Sayedkhail as saying.
    A stepped-up insurgency led by the Islamist Taliban movement
has targeted foreign troops and the government of President Hamid
Karzai this year. Most of the violence has focused in the south
and in the east along the border with Pakistan, leaving northern
Afghanistan relatively untouched.

--Editors: H. Langan (jjd)

To contact the reporter on this story:
Patrick Donahue in Berlin at +49-30-70010-6220 or at
pdonahue1@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Peter Torday at +44-20-7330-7539 or
ptorday@bloomberg.net.

[TAGINFO]

NI SUM
NI GEN
NI AFGHAN
NI MIDEAST
NI TERROR
NI US
NI UK
NI ASIA
NI GOV
NI POL
NI WAR
NI DEF


#<609427.1004661.1.0.60.17559.25>#
-0- Nov/06/2007 13:41 GMT


Tuesday, November 06, 2007

 

NYT: 2007 Is Deadliest Year for U.S. Troops in Iraq



November 7, 2007

2007 Is Deadliest Year for U.S. Troops in Iraq

BAGHDAD, Nov. 6 — Six American soldiers were killed in three separate attacks Monday, the military said Tuesday, taking the number of deaths this year to 852 and making 2007 the deadliest year of the war for United States troops.

Military officials announced the discovery of a mass grave holding 22 bodies in a rural area north of Falluja. It also said that nine Iranians being held in Iraq would soon be released, including two detained during a January raid of a consulate office in Erbil.

Five of the American soldiers died in two roadside bomb attacks on Monday near Kirkuk, said Rear Adm. Gregory Smith, director of the communications division of the Multinational Force-Iraq, the formal name for the United States-led forces.

A sixth soldier died Monday during combat operations in Anbar Province, according to a military statement.

The deaths come only a few days after the military announced a steep drop in the rate of American deaths this year. In October, 38 American service members died in Iraq, the third-lowest monthly tally since 2003, according to Iraq Casualty Count, a Web site that tracks military deaths. November's total, if the current pace continues, would be higher but still far below the war's average of 69 American military deaths per month.

Despite the decline, American commanders acknowledged that 2007 would be far deadlier than the second-worst year, 2004, when 849 Americans died, many of them in major battles for control of insurgent strongholds like Falluja.

Military officials attribute the rise this year to an expanded troop presence during the so-called surge, which brought more than 165,000 troops to Iraq, and sent units out of large bases and into more dangerous communities.

Commanders maintain that despite the high cost in terms of lives lost, the strategy has brought improved security to the country and "tactical momentum" that could stabilize Iraq permanently.

The potential release of the Iranians may reflect American approval of some signs that Iran is cooperating with their demand that it stanch the flow of materials into Iraq used to make deadly roadside bombs known as explosively formed projectiles, or E.F.P.'s.

Admiral Smith said that the E.F.P. components found recently during raids "do not appear to have arrived here in Iraq after those pledges were made," suggesting that Iran has limited trafficking the weapon parts across the border after promising to do so.

American commanders have stopped short of declaring that Iran has in fact complied with the United States' demands, and Admiral Smith on Tuesday described the plan to release nine Iranian prisoners not as a diplomatic reward but rather as the perfunctory end to a criminal investigation.

"These individuals have no continuing value, nor do they pose a further threat to Iraqi security," he said.

Admiral Smith did not say why the two Iranians captured in January at an Iranian consulate office in Erbil were held for nine months, after Iran insisted that they were harmless government workers.

But Iraqi officials welcomed the announcement. Mohammed Al Haj Hamud, Iraq's deputy foreign minister, said the release would "improve the relations between the three countries" of Iraq, Iran and the United States before another round of planned meetings on security. "We want good relations with Iran and for Iran to avoid conducting any actions inside Iraq," he said. "A the same time, the Iraqi government is keen to maintain its relationship with its first and strongest ally, the United States of America.

Meanwhile, violence against Iraqis continued. The mass grave was found Saturday during a joint American-Iraqi operation in the Lake Tharthar area, a desolate rural area near the site of another grave, holding 25 bodies, that was found less than a month ago.

Local police officials said the bodies were dumped in and around an abandoned building.

"Some were buried in wells and some were left in rooms used as prisons," said a police officer who helped clear the grave. "These corpses are part of what we expect to find more of in the future."

Just south of Kirkuk, the police said that clashes with Iraqi and American forces on Tuesday left four gunmen dead. In a separate incident, gunmen attacked and killed the mayor of small village about 30 miles south of Kirkuk, and wounded his son, as they drove to a neighboring town.

A member of the governing council in Mosul was also assassinated in a neighborhood on the city's outskirts, the authorities said, and six policemen died when they were ambushed while driving to work.

And in Baghdad, the police found four dead bodies, two east of the Tigris River, two to the west. A roadside bomb exploded near an American patrol near Zawra park in western Baghdad, and a second bomb exploded in the central Baghdad neighborhood of Karrada, an interior ministry official said. He said it was unclear if there were any casualties.

South of the capital, in Latafiya, a bomb targeting a joint Iraqi-American foot patrol killed one Iraqi soldier. North of Hilla, the authorities found the body of a man in his 20s floating in a small river. He had been stabbed to death.



Saturday, November 03, 2007

 

NYT: Bush’s Dangerous Liaisons



October 28, 2007
Op-Ed Contributor

Bush's Dangerous Liaisons

Montreal

MUCH as George W. Bush's presidency was ineluctably shaped by Sept. 11, 2001, so the outbreak of the French Revolution was symbolized by the events of one fateful day, July 14, 1789. And though 18th-century France may seem impossibly distant to contemporary Americans, future historians examining Mr. Bush's presidency within the longer sweep of political and intellectual history may find the French Revolution useful in understanding his curious brand of 21st- century conservatism.

Soon after the storming of the Bastille, pro-Revolutionary elements came together to form an association that would become known as the Jacobin Club, an umbrella group of politicians, journalists and citizens dedicated to advancing the principles of the Revolution.

The Jacobins shared a defining ideological feature. They divided the world between pro- and anti-Revolutionaries — the defenders of liberty versus its enemies. The French Revolution, as they understood it, was the great event that would determine whether liberty was to prevail on the planet or whether the world would fall back into tyranny and despotism.

The stakes could not be higher, and on these matters there could be no nuance or hesitation. One was either for the Revolution or for tyranny.

By 1792, France was confronting the hostility of neighboring countries, debating how to react. The Jacobins were divided. On one side stood the journalist and political leader Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, who argued for war.

Brissot understood the war as preventive — "une guerre offensive," he called it — to defeat the despotic powers of Europe before they could organize their counter-Revolutionary strike. It would not be a war of conquest, as Brissot saw it, but a war "between liberty and tyranny."

Pro-war Jacobins believed theirs was a mission not for a single nation or even for a single continent. It was, in Brissot's words, "a crusade for universal liberty."

Brissot's opponents were skeptical. "No one likes armed missionaries," declared Robespierre, with words as apt then as they remain today. Not long after the invasion of Austria, the military tide turned quickly against France.

The United States, France's "sister republic," refused to enter the war on France's side. It was an infuriating show of ingratitude, as the French saw it, coming from a fledgling nation they had magnanimously saved from foreign occupation in a previous war.

Confronted by a monarchical Europe united in opposition to revolutionary France — old Europe, they might have called it — the Jacobins rooted out domestic political dissent. It was the beginning of the period that would become infamous as the Terror.

Among the Jacobins' greatest triumphs was their ability to appropriate the rhetoric of patriotism — Le Patriote Français was the title of Brissot's newspaper — and to promote their political program through a tightly coordinated network of newspapers, political hacks, pamphleteers and political clubs.

Even the Jacobins' dress distinguished "true patriots": those who wore badges of patriotism like the liberty cap on their heads, or the cocarde tricolore (a red, white and blue rosette) on their hats or even on their lapels.

Insisting that their partisan views were identical to the national will, believing that only they could save France from apocalyptic destruction, Jacobins could not conceive of legitimate dissent. Political opponents were treasonous, stabbing France and the Revolution in the back.

To defend the nation from its enemies, Jacobins expanded the government's police powers at the expense of civil liberties, endowing the state with the power to detain, interrogate and imprison suspects without due process. Policies like the mass warrantless searches undertaken in 1792 — "domicilary visits," they were called — were justified, according to Georges Danton, the Jacobin leader, "when the homeland is in danger."

Robespierre — now firmly committed to the most militant brand of Jacobinism — condemned the "treacherous insinuations" cast by those who questioned "the excessive severity of measures prescribed by the public interest." He warned his political opponents, "This severity is alarming only for the conspirators, only for the enemies of liberty." Such measures, then as now, were undertaken to protect the nation — indeed, to protect liberty itself.

If the French Terror had a slogan, it was that attributed to the great orator Louis de Saint-Just: "No liberty for the enemies of liberty." Saint-Just's pithy phrase (like President Bush's variant, "We must not let foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself") could serve as the very antithesis of the Western liberal tradition.

On this principle, the Terror demonized its political opponents, imprisoned suspected enemies without trial and eventually sent thousands to the guillotine. All of these actions emerged from the Jacobin worldview that the enemies of liberty deserved no rights.

Though it has been a topic of much attention in recent years, the origin of the term "terrorist" has gone largely unnoticed by politicians and pundits alike. The word was an invention of the French Revolution, and it referred not to those who hate freedom, nor to non-state actors, nor of course to "Islamofascism."

A terroriste was, in its original meaning, a Jacobin leader who ruled France during la Terreur.

François Furstenberg, a professor of history at the University of Montreal, is the author of "In the Name of the Father: Washington's Legacy, Slavery and the Making of a Nation."



Thursday, November 01, 2007

 

AlterNet: Curveball: The Iraqi Defector the Bush Team Used to Sell the War



Curveball: The Iraqi Defector the Bush Team Used to Sell the War

By Joshua Holland, AlterNet. Posted October 22, 2007.


A interview with the author of a new book on the Iraqi defector code-named "Curveball," whose made-up intelligence on Saddam's WMD programs was central to the Bush Administration's case for invasion.

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After four years watching the disastrous consequences of the invasion of Iraq unfold, it's easy to forget the atmosphere of panic in which the war was sold to the American public. All the talk of clandestine meetings in Prague, dubious connections between Iraq and 9/11, aluminum tubes and yellowcake from Niger is becoming a memory; it seems ages since we were warned that the "smoking gun" that proved Saddam's deadly intent might be in the form of a mushroom cloud rising from one of America's cities.

Yet it's important to recall that after all the rhetoric about Saddam Hussein's monstrous legacy and Colin Powell's flashy charts and honey-smooth presentation at the UN, the heart of the Bush administration's case for invading Iraq -- or at least for its claims about massive stockpiles of biological weapons being driven around the country in high-tech mobile labs to avoid detection -- was an Iraqi defector code-named "Curveball."

In CURVEBALL: Spies, Lies and the Con Man Who Caused a War,veteran Los Angeles Times reporter Bob Drogin, who originally broke the story, paints a picture of a desperate refugee who, while trying to gain asylum in Europe, began feeding claims about Saddam's supposed weapons programs to an intelligence community that was under intense pressure from the top to come up with a case for war.

Curveball, who claimed to be an Iraqi chemical engineer with knowledge of even the country's most secret weapons programs, spilled the beans in a big way when debriefed by German intelligence officials. But, as Drogin would later report, he was a twitchy, possibly mentally disturbed drunk who was prone to rapid mood-swings and whose story tended to shift according to what he thought investigators wanted to hear. But despite that fact, and with only the "corroboration" of a few ex-patriots associated with convicted fraudster Ahmed Chalabi, Curveball's claims passed through several layers of often skeptical intelligence professionals and became 'Exhibit A' in the administration's case for war.

Drogin's account is a detailed one from the perspective of an old national security hand, with plenty of inside scoop -- the kind of reporting, brimming with internecine fighting and bureaucratic intrigue, that will give the pundits on both sides of the war some new grist for debate. It's also a page-turner that feels more like a Tom Clancy novel than most nonfiction.

AlterNet caught up with Drogin in New York City.

Joshua Holland: You've described a very unstable character, and reported that there was no shortage of people in the intelligence community who expressed deep misgivings about his reliability. Give me a sense of how the story unfolded -- how did his claims get through all those intelligence pros?

Bob Drogin: Well, the CIA heard what it wanted to hear. It saw what it wanted to see. And it told the president what he wanted to hear. Time and again, intelligence officials discounted contradictory information, filled in gaps, and made up the dots to reach the conclusion they wanted. In part, they were caught up in the climate of fear after 9/11 and felt they couldn't afford to underestimate a possible threat. In part, there was a clear understanding by late 2002 that we were going to war and it would make no difference, and probably would hurt your career, if you tried to get in the way. But mostly, I think incompetence and poor leadership allowed unconfirmed and unreliable information to move up the chain of command. Those few intelligence officers who tried to raise red flags, or issue warnings, either were ignored or treated like heretics. And by the time Colin Powell goes to the U.N. to make the case for war, he shows the world artists' conjectures based on analysts' interpretations and extrapolations of Arabic-to-German-to-English translations of summary debriefing reports of interviews with a manic-depressive defector whom the Americans had never met. Tenet told Powell that Curveball's information was ironclad and unassailable. It was a travesty.

Holland: You wrote about the deep distrust between the American intelligence agencies -- especially the CIA -- and their German counterparts. How did that contribute to the debacle?

Drogin: I became fascinated by the mostly unknown, and truly sordid history between the CIA and its German counterpart, the BND. U.S. authorities chose one of Hitler's top spymasters, a senior figure in the Nazi high command, to start and run the West German intelligence service after World War II. It became a rat line for SS, Gestapo and even members of Adolph Eichmann's staff. Partly as a result, the BND was repeatedly penetrated by East German and other Soviet bloc forces, and it repeatedly betrayed U.S. and other Western intelligence operations. By the time the Berlin Wall came down, there were just decades of distrust and resentment between them. The new German government tried to reign in the CIA, which enjoyed almost extra-legal powers, and it produced a series of embarrassing scandals on both sides. That was the state of play when Curveball defected to Germany in 1999.

During the interrogation period, Curveball's BND case officer remembered the bad old days and refused to allow the Americans to interview his source. It was a matter of pride for him and his colleagues. So they came up with a silly lie - that Curveball spoke no English and hated Americans. Actually he liked Americans. And he spoke better English than German. There was another problem at a higher level. After 9/11, the Bush administration repeatedly blamed German authorities for not stopping the Hamburg Cell led by Mohammed Atta. The head of the German intelligence system during Curveball was the former Hamburg police chief. And this guy deeply resented the notion that the Americans blamed him for 9/11. He didn't trust the CIA -- didn't like them -- and it really colored his thinking.

After the Curveball story broke, of course, the CIA tried to blame the Germans for their unwillingness to let them meet Curveball. That was pure spin, or disinformation. The CIA would never let the BND meet an important CIA source, either. The CIA won't even let other U.S. intelligence agencies interview a CIA source. The fact is the U.S. went to war after relying in part on information from a guy they had never met, so they've tried really hard to blame others.

Holland: As an old hand covering national security, do you think anything has changed in that respect? You, know, as a result of the agency's experience with Curveball?

Drogin: Not really. What happened in this case was a systemic failure that took place at multiple levels over a period of years. The most dramatic changes took place immediately after 9/11, when all the caveats about Curveball simply disappeared from classified reports. The secrecy and compartmentalization that permeates intelligence meant that it became increasingly difficult for anyone to know for sure what Curveball really said, or whether it was corroborated, or if any of his information was true. I don't see that any of the post-war reorganization schemes, or the new bureaucracy under the director of national intelligence, makes that less likely.

Holland: I guess the big question that will surely be debated again with your book is to what degree the Bush administration manipulated the intelligence to get us into a war with Iraq. You're surely no apologist for Bush, but the subtitle of your book suggests that Curveball -- or, more accurately, bad intelligence -- led to the invasion. And while you say in the book that U.S. officials "twisted and magnified his account in grotesque ways," you also told Harper's that it was more an intelligence failure than a case of "cherry-picking." Can you square that for me? Isn't stripping equivocations and caveats from intelligence reports what "cherry-picking" means?

Drogin: I don't see that as an either-or proposition. Both happened. The White House clearly manipulated information to make its case for war. It exaggerated the supposed link between Saddam and 9/11, for example, going far beyond what the CIA believed. My point to Harpers was that the White House didn't need to "cherry pick" intelligence on Saddam's WMD because the CIA stuff was all wrong. And it flowed into the White House by the truckload. Go back and read Powell's 2003 U.N. speech, or the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, the so-called gold standard of the U.S. intelligence community. Virtually every sentence is wrong. That was the official view. It gave them the pretext for war.

So, to be clear: I believe George Bush will go down as one of the worst presidents in our history. He took the nation into an unnecessary war that is now a tragedy of epic proportions. He alone is responsible for that decision. I assume that my readers understand that. So in the book, I try to unravel the CIA role in this, not absolve Bush. This is not a book about policy, or reform proposals, or internal debates in the White House. I wanted to understand how an intelligence system that spends about $50 billion a year could produce the worst intelligence disaster in our history. The cascade of mistakes in the Curveball case is a big part of the answer.

Holland: I want to go outside of the book for a moment, and take advantage of your experience covering national security and intelligence issues for the Los Angeles Times. A vital question, that I think hasn't been aired accurately is this: how did the debate over Saddam Hussein possessing weapons of mass destruction become a kind of proxy for the debate about whether Iraq was a threat?

Drogin: I'm not sure what you mean. That was the debate; it wasn't a proxy for anything.

Holland: What I mean is this: if Saddam Hussein had some chemical weapons or some biological weapons -- I think the nuclear case was the thinnest -- but no delivery system and no obvious intent to use them, then he didn't pose a direct threat to the security of the United States. But it seemed like that issue wasn't really debated separate from the question of what he might have had hidden away somewhere.

Drogin: It's a good point, because in my view, having covered the debate -- I went to the UN for every one of Powell's visits, I was writing about this in Washington -- there is a sort of revisionism that's happening now, where people are saying 'well we knew he had no weapons of mass destruction. Everyone knew this -- Bush knew it and the CIA knew it.' But the fact is, if you go back and read what Hans Blix, head of the UN's weapons inspection program, wrote at the time, he didn't say 'Saddam Hussein has no weapons.' Only Saddam was saying that. The French didn't say that, the Germans didn't say that and the Russians didn't say that. The debate in the UN -- and you're right, not in this country -- was not whether he has them, but what is the nature of that threat and how best to counter it. The issues were: how should we deal with it in terms of stronger sanctions, more overflights, getting the inspectors back in, giving them more tools, getting them greater access to things, how much time would they need -- that was the debate at the UN. The problem is -- and this is where the administration was very deceitful -- is that there is a long, long chain of events and activities between having zero weapons and the famous statement that we wouldn't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud. On any of those weapons systems, between intentions, capabilities, programs, stockpiles, delivery systems -- these are very elaborate things but it was all sort of conflated into 'oh my God, he's got WMD, we've got to take him out.'

That debate did not happen here, in part because the intelligence was so bad. It was like witchcraft -- the failure to find proof was considered proof itself. So it became 'not only does he have them, but look at how good he is at hiding them.' So the threat was even greater. Our fears blinded us, I think -- and the politicians used that to engender a state of national concern. But I think -- and I know not everyone agrees with this -- I don't know anyone in the intelligence community, any weapons inspector (except for Scott Ritter who is in a separate category for a number of reasons) who did not believe [Hussein] had ongoing programs of some kind. Whatever they might have been, they thought he had ongoing programs of some kind. Stockpiles were another issue, and a lot of people thought he had so-called "just in time" programs -- that he didn't need to build armories of these things as long as he had a system in place that can create what he needed when he needed it.

But the question was: how great is the threat and how best to counter it and that's where the debate should have been in this country, but we never had it. And you know, people blame the press, but I blame Congress. I mean, I was in Washington and there was no debate. Democrats were running absolutely scared, running with their tails between their legs and the Republicans all lined up behind Bush. And the press can only do so much -- in the end, I'm a reporter and I can't prove a negative. I'm not going to go out and say he doesn't have weapons, I don't see the intelligence, I don't know …

Holland: OK, but the question is: do you think they did an adequate job exploring the context? And specifically around this question, you talk about the debate at the UN … how did we get past the discussion everyone else was having about the appropriate response, and do you think the media did it's job in terms of presenting that …

Drogin: Right, but who's the media here? Define "the media."

Holland: Well, I would say …

Drogin: Did you write about it?

Holland: Yes I did.

Drogin: Well you're the media.

Holland: Yes. The alternative media.

Drogin: Well I wrote about it.

Holland: About whether he was a threat aside from …

Drogin: No, my issue was … I get my hackles up a bit when people say the press failed. What they're sort of saying is: 'The New York Times failed.' And they did. The media is not monolithic, and some outlets were better than others. I think we were very skeptical at the Los Angeles Times, where I work. I mean, should we have done a better job? Of course. Did the New York Times screw up? Or Fox News? Yes. But it's a pretty broad spectrum out there these days and it depends on where you get your information. So I think people mean the New York Times and it's true that they set the agenda. But, honestly … if members of Congress had fought that battle then it would have been covered and the debate would have been there. There's only so much you can do as a reporter to create a debate. You write a story and it gets picked up or it doesn't -- I'm not an editorial writer…

Holland: But 6 out of 10 House Democrats voted against the resolution to go to war, they must have expressed a reason …

Drogin: Do you remember the debate?

Holland: I remember what passed for a debate …

Drogin: Exactly.

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Joshua Holland is an AlterNet staff writer.



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